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Poverty, Policy Reforms for Resource-use and Economic Efficiency: 
Neglected Issues 
 
Abstract 
It is widely believed that in developing countries, open-access to natural resources, 
inadequate private property rights, and lack of development of market systems adds 
to the incidence of poverty. Increased economic efficiency is seen as a powerful 
force for reducing the extent of poverty in developing countries in the long run. 
While this may be so, it ignores the depth and incidence of poverty that can be 
generated during adjustments to policy reforms. This possibility constrains policy 
choices as is shown theoretically for natural resource policies and for agricultural 
adjustment policies giving Asian examples. Social, behavioral and institutional 
features are also considered that may result in poverty lock-in of some groups. It is 
essential to consider dynamic processes and not to rely solely on comparative 
statics when assessing economic policies to reduce poverty and increase economic 
efficiency. It is also important to take into account institutional constraints on 
policy choices. 
 
Keywords:  Adjustment to policy change; agricultural policy; Asia; economic 
efficiencies; institutionalism; market reforms; natural resource policies; poverty. 
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Poverty, Policy Reforms for Resource-use and Economic Efficiency: 
Neglected Issues 
 
1. Introduction 
Open-access to natural resources, lack of establishment of private property rights, and 
insufficient extension of market systems in developing countries are often seen by 
economists as features that contribute to economic inefficiency and which add to the 
incidence of poverty in such countries, as for example pointed out by Dasgupta, 1993, 
Ch.6. Consequently, it is often recommended that access to and use of shared natural 
resources be subject to (improved) government regulation and/or that private property 
rights in resources be more widely established, and that competitive market systems 
be extended. While this view might have some long-run merit, the theories 
underpinning it are based on comparative statics and assume a society in which 
individuals are perfectly mobile. Hence, these proposals usually ignore the dynamics 
of adjustment and overlook barriers to policy implementation, such as initial increases 
in the incidence and depth of poverty before such policies become effective. The 
purpose of this article is to bring attention to such issues and consider their 
implications for public policies intended to increase economic efficiency and reduce 
the incidence of poverty. 
 
First, policy barriers (arising from initial increases in the incidence and depth of 
poverty and income reduction) to raising the economic efficiency of using shared 
natural resources in developing countries are discussed. This is particularly relevant to 
open-access resources. Then limits to the private property solution are explored. In 
some circumstances, creation of private property is not efficient and can add to the 
occurrence of poverty. Subsequently, the difficulties which poor rural landholders and 
users of common resources face in adjusting to the extension of the market system are 
considered. Institutional and behavioral factors that may lock some social groups into 
poverty are also explored.  
 
Note that an economy will be regarded as achieving economic efficiency when it 
satisfies the conditions for a Pareto optimum. A change that results in Kaldor-Hicks 
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improvement (a potential Paretian improvement) is viewed here as being one that 
increases economic efficiency. 
 
2. Poverty and Income Barriers to Efficient use of Shared Natural Resources 
The purpose of this section is to show how developing countries often get locked into 
the excessive use of natural resources. It shows that once overexploitation of the 
natural resources occurs, policies to increase economic efficiency of resource-use are 
usually socially unacceptable because they initially cause too much economic 
suffering to those they are intended to help. Then reasons are considered why 
governments permit over exploitation of natural resources to develop. 
 
The problem can be illustrated by using a simple diagram commonly used to show 
how open-access to a renewable resource leads to economic inefficiency (Gordon 
1954, Tisdell 2005, Ch.6) and by modifying the exposition to fit the type of situation 
likely to arise in developing countries. This is shown in Figure 1 and may apply, for 
example, to the harvest of fish, forest resources, utilization of shared pastures and 
similar biological resources. On the X-axis, the number of units of effort (x) employed 
in utilizing the natural resource are shown and on the Y-axis, units of output are 
indicated. Units of effort might be measured by the number of persons using the 
resource by working a standard number of hours with a standard bundle of 
complementary materials. Assume this interpretation. 
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Figure 1. Diagram used to illustrate the poverty trap problem arising from open-
access to a biological natural resource. 
 
In Figure 1, the line marked HS is assumed to represent the supply of effort, the line 
marked ABD is the long-term marginal product of the effort and the line AFG is the 
corresponding average product. The latter are long-term production relationships 
because they are based on the long-term population dynamics of ecological systems. 
 
Given open-access and the supply curve HS, long-term equilibrium will be 
established at point F. If line HS represents the marginal opportunity cost of effort 
expended in utilizing the shared resource, this result is economically inefficient. In 
this case, a potential Paretian improvement is possible in the long-term by reducing 
effort in utilizing the shared natural resource from x3 to x1. But in developing 
countries, the supply curve of effort in exploiting the material resources may not 
represent the opportunity cost of the variable inputs if used elsewhere. These could be 
lower than OH in Figure 1 if, for example, HS corresponds to a subsistence level of 
income. Those employed in exploiting the natural resources may not have much 
economic value elsewhere in the economy and there may be barriers, such as 
transaction costs, involved in their movement. 
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Given the lack of mobility of rural dwellers, policies to improve long-term efficiency 
and raise incomes of those dependent on the natural resource can have disastrous 
consequences in the short-term. This term may not be all that short, as pointed out by 
Keynes (1936). For example, given the initial equilibrium at F, a policy to shift this 
equilibrium to B will initially leave the biomass and other features of biological 
natural resource unchanged. If each person utilizing the resource is required to reduce 
their effort by (x3 − x1)/x3, the income of each falls immediately by this proportion 
because initially the output/effort ratio remains constant. Income levels could, 
therefore, fall initially below the subsistence level. How rapidly incomes per head 
subsequently rise depends on the speed of recovery of the biomass of the biological 
resource following the reduction in its intensity of use. This will vary depending on 
the type of biological resource involved. In the case of k-selected biological resources, 
that is ones with a slow reproduction rate, the rate of recovery in income will be slow; 
moving from F to B will be a slow process. The length of income deprivation would 
be much longer when k-selected species are involved than in the case of r-selected 
species, that is species with a rapid reproduction rate. 
 
An alternative to reducing the effort of all persons exploiting the natural resource 
would be to exclude some completely from its exploitation. In this case, those 
contributing x3 − x1 of effort could be excluded. However, those excluded may have 
few if any other economic alternatives and may be unable to survive. Therefore, this 
policy is unlikely to be socially acceptable. 
 
In many Asian countries, fishing effort exceeds that consistent with maximum 
economic yield and fish stocks continue to decline. This is true, for example, for 
Thailand and seems to be so for many of the artisinal fisheries of Indonesia. The Thai 
government attempted to enforce local fishing restrictions to increase fish yields in the 
long-term, for example, the maximum size of mesh in nets was increased. This led to 
protests by fishermen who, amongst other things, kept their children away from 
school. The government was forced to back down. Again, the Indonesian government 
recognizes that many of its artisinal fisheries are over exploited. However, it does not 
take action to reduce fish catches because its artisinal fishermen are already poor and 
will suffer severely in the adjustment process. One suspects that this is also true in the 
Philippines and many other developing countries. 
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 Given the lack of mobility of rural labour, a policy of trying to maximize the 
sustainable yield (MSY) from the biological resource rather than the economic yield 
(MEY) might be considered. In Figure 1 this would require reducing effort from x3 to 
x2. In the long term, this would generate an increase in output equal to the area of 
triangle CDK. However, the problem still remains that per capita incomes will at first 
be depressed by restricting effort. If per capita incomes are already low, no leeway 
exists for doing this. If incomes are somewhat higher, there is leeway to do this but 
the policy may be unpopular. 
 
Those having open-access to natural resources also fail to take into account user costs 
in their decision-making and this can result in unsustainable use of the resource. Once 
over-exploitation of the resources has developed, public policies to deal with the 
problem can face similar difficulties to those outlined in the previous case. For 
instance, consider a water aquifer from which water is being drawn at a faster rate 
than its rate of recharge. This is a well known open-access case (see for example, 
Dasgupta, 2001, p.108). Water reserves may allow excess use to occur for a time but 
eventually this rate of use will not be sustainable and the lowering of the level of the 
aquifer will add to the cost of the water supply. However, if incomes of farmers using 
the water are already low, government measures to reduce their water use will depress 
their income further. They will be unpopular even though they are rational efficiency 
measures because they bring use and recharge into balance, and may restore the level 
of the aquifer. If the rate of use is initially determined so that it is somewhat less than 
the rate of recharge, the original level of the aquifer will be eventually restored and 
water extraction costs reduced. A government may, however, have a reduced political 
support if it intervenes. 
 
There are many examples of government failure in relation to the utilization of 
aquifers in Asia. A well known case is that in Taiwan. There underground water was 
continuously used without restrictions for aquaculture and irrigation. This resulted in 
falling water tables, land subsidence, and in some cases, saltwater intrusion into the 
aquifers due to lack of government action.  
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Similar problems arise in relation to use of several inland water bodies in Asia. In 
many cases, water use exceeds the inflow of new water. The off-take of water from 
rivers and streams feeding these bodies is so large that their levels fall and adverse 
economic externalities occur. This happened to Dong Ting Lake in Northern Hunan 
Province, China. This lake is China’s second largest freshwater lake. Serious 
problems have also arisen from the use of water supplying the Aral Sea, the level of 
which is falling. The latter problem is made worse by the fact that this freshwater sea 
is a resource shared by several countries and the rivers feeding it flow through several 
nations: transboundary problems exist. Some interesting background on the ecological 
fate of the Aral Sea is available in Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aral_Sea). 
However, even in cases where transboundary problems are not present, it seems that 
governments fail to act or are tardy in regulating the use of shared natural resources. 
Once these resources become over exploited, developing countries are unable to 
implement policies to extricate those on low incomes from their economic 
predicament. 
 
Why do governments allow the above problems to develop?  One explanation is that 
government policies are often reactive rather than proactive. Initially as the 
exploitation of an open-access resource progresses, there is no apparent economic 
problem: above normal incomes may be earned and no threat to the sustainability of 
the resource is apparent. The decline in incomes may be gradual. By the time 
problems become pressing, the incomes of those exploiting the resource are likely to 
have fallen to low levels. A government in a developing country then has little leeway 
(as was illustrated above) to deal with the problem if those dependent of the use of the 
natural resource have a low level of mobility in the economy. 
 
3. Private Property as a Solution to Inefficient Resource Use and/or a Means to 
Reduce Poverty. 
The creation of private property rights in resources such as land, is often seen as a 
means to increase economic efficiency and to reduce the extent of poverty, at least in 
the longer term. This is a possibility. Some writers (e.g. North and Thomas, 1976, 
North, 1990) associate the creation of private property rights with economic 
development and with improvements in economic performance. However, it is not 
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always economic or practical to establish private property rights for all natural 
resources, for example, in mobile wild fish species.  
 
Furthermore, the establishment of private property rights can initially create 
considerable economic hardship in situations in which open-access has previously 
prevailed. For example, if there is open-access and the situation shown in Figure 1 
prevails with equilibrium at F, creation of private property rights is likely to result in 
initial economic hardship. Some of those using the natural resource are likely to be 
excluded from its use and may have few, if any, economic alternatives in less 
developed countries. If the owners of the resource are landlords, it is even possible 
that the lot of those utilizing the resource does not improve after the creation of 
private property. After the extraction of rent by the owners of the natural resource, the 
income of those directly employed in exploiting it may remain at subsistence level in 
the new equilibrium. Depending on social and institutional factors, the landlords may 
fail to invest their rent in a manner that promotes economic development. So in some 
institutional circumstances, the private property solution may be no better (or even 
worse) than on open-access one from an economic point of view. 
 
Dasgupta (1997, p.17) summarises the distributional consequences of privatisation of 
the village commons as follows: “Many of the studies suggest that privatisation of 
village commons and forest land, while hallowed at the altar of economic efficiency, 
can have disastrous distributional consequences, disenfranchising entire classes of 
people. The point is a simple one: unless an appropriate fraction of the rents earned 
from the resource base subsequent to privatization are given to customary users, they 
become worse off”. 
 
Attention was originally brought to this problem by Weitzman (1974). He argued that 
under private ownership of a previously open-access resource, former common-
property users working as wage-earners for private owners of the resource have a 
reduced level of aggregate income. His argument is based on comparative statics and 
is similar to that given above in discussing Figure 1. 
 
In some cases, also the creation of private property in natural resources, such as land, 
may generate adverse environmental spillovers, create new sustainability problems or 
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be the result of misguided public policies. On occasions, use of privately owned land, 
for instance, generates negative environmental externalities (Dasgupta, 2001, Ch.7). 
This can result in increased overall economic scarcity. Furthermore, private 
ownership does not ensure sustainable resource uses. If the private rate of return from 
use of the resource is less than the prevailing rate of interest, there will be a private 
incentive to liquidate the resource (Clark, 1976).  
 
When the creation of private property rights becomes a political mantra, situations can 
occur in which the creation of private property rights adds to economic scarcity and 
the extent of poverty. For example, suppose a geographical area used initially for the 
shared grazing of livestock. However, a portion of it is suitable for the growing of 
crops using irrigation. Suppose that the government decides to convert this land into 
private property which is to be used for crop growing. The graziers are excluded from 
this land and their access to water for their livestock may become difficult. The degree 
of impoverishment of the graziers may consequently increase and the net value of 
production from the geographical area could fall. Developments of this type are said 
to have occurred in parts of Africa. 
 
Sometimes, also governments promote agricultural development and provide land 
rights to settlers in regions where this is completely uneconomic and agriculture is not 
sustainable. Examples of this include some components of Indonesian transmigration 
programme. For instance, farmers have been settled on drained areas of former peat 
bogs in Kalimantan and allocated land rights. But such areas are unable to sustain 
agricultural production and the utilization of the land for agriculture results in many 
serious adverse environmental externalities (Singleton et al., 2004, p.170). These 
include increased frequency of forest fires, peat fires which are extremely difficult to 
extinguish (all of which adds to smoke pollution, a serious problem in Southeast Asia 
and result in increased greenhouse gas emissions), collapse of surrounding forests due 
to falling water tables, and loss of biodiversity. In the long-term, those families settled 
in such areas are liable sink into poverty as the land on which they are settled is 
unable to sustain its agricultural productivity. 
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4. Market Extension and Poverty Generation in Rural Areas 
Market extension is often suggested as an effective means of reducing the incidence 
and depth of poverty in developing countries (World Bank, 1986). While this may be 
so in the long run, extension of and transition to market systems in rural areas may 
initially be associated with a rise in the incidence and severity of rural poverty. In 
assessing this possibility, at least three factors need to be taken into account: (1) 
adjustments to market systems usually involve learning, uncertainty and investment; 
(2) common access to shared resources is likely to be curtailed with possible adverse 
economic consequences for the poor; and (3) migration to find alternative 
employment may be a greater economic problem for the poor than those who are 
better off. Let us consider each of these factors in turn. 
 
Adjustment to market systems involve learning, uncertainty and investment 
For those not familiar with market systems, the introduction or extension of market 
systems involves considerable cultural adjustment and usually on alteration in social 
values. Apart from this, market systems result in considerable changes in the 
economic use of resources as time passes. Farmers, for example, may find that types 
of crops or other land use which were once economic are no longer economic (or are 
much less so than alternatives) once market systems are introduced or extended. This 
can be a problem for the poor because switching of land use generally requires 
investment and some extra risk or uncertainty. In addition, a period of learning by 
doing may be involved. During this period, the costs of those switching land uses may 
be above those in the industry and their returns lower. In the early learning period 
those trying new land uses (that may eventually be more profitable) may suffer losses. 
 
Theoretically, the issue can be illustrated by Figure 2. Suppose initially that there is an 
established land use that gives a farmer an income of OA but at t1 market conditions 
change so that without a change in land use the existing land use results in falling 
farm income represented by line BD. However, an alternative land use is available 
which in due course results in a higher income. If this alternative is pursued at t1, the 
trajectory of income is BFGH. At first, income falls below BGD because of initial 
learning requirements. This income-sacrifice involved in switching is a type of 
investment. In addition, new investment in physical capital may be required. This may 
9 
initially result in a significant fall in cash flow below B (not shown) if the investment 
is self financed. 
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Figure 2. Alternative income consequences for a farmer of adjustment to market 
change and non-adjustment to market change. 
 
Poorer farmers in a rural community may be unable to adjust or able to adjust only 
imperfectly to significant market changes (Tisdell, 2003). They may not have access 
to credit or accumulated funds for investment in facilities to bring about changes in 
land use. Furthermore, they may not be able to cope with the fall in income and 
uncertainty that arises during the adjustment period. The poor may, therefore, 
continue with their initial land-use practices. Consequently, their income falls and 
their degree of impoverishment rises. As a result, as time passes, the poor become 
trapped. Their economic scope for switching land-use patterns diminishes and they 
are likely to be forced eventually to abandon their land which may be acquired by 
richer farmers. 
 
These patterns are consistent with, for example, the observation of Mordoch (1993) 
that poor farmers were tardy in adopting hybrid seed in India compared to richer 
farmers (see also Duflo, 2006, p.372). However, this is not necessarily because they 
are more risk averse. They do in fact have less credit available, and less savings, 
lower incomes and are more vulnerable than the rich. For the poor, market adjustment 
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is a major problem and is likely when markets are significantly extended to cause 
them distress. As Bardhan and Udry (1999, p.62) point out, in developing countries 
“land [usually] passes from distressed small farmers to landlords and money-lenders”. 
 
With China’s entry into the WTO, there were concerns in China that agriculturalists in 
China’s Northeast region might have to make substantial economic adjustment 
because of their reliance on soya beans and maize for income (Tisdell, 2003a). It was 
thought that these poor farmers might have to switch to alternative crops with which 
they were unfamiliar because of possible US exports to China. This raised the type of 
potential adjustment problems outlined above using Figure 2. 
 
Exclusion from use of shared resources 
As the market system develops, the poor may be increasingly excluded from the use 
of shared natural resources. It may happen that these resources increasingly become 
private property (for example, as a result of land enclosures) or become state property 
(for example, assertion by the state of rights in natural forests and the state in turn 
may give concessions to individuals and companies for the exclusive exploitation of 
these). Several authors (for example, North and Thomas, 1976; North, 1990) have 
suggested that with economic development and the extension of market systems that 
private property regimes become more pervasive.  
 
In this process, it is likely that the richer numbers of society gain natural resources 
whereas the poorer members experience a net loss of use of natural resources (see for 
example, Bardhan and Udry, 1999, Ch.13). The richer numbers of society are usually 
better educated and have wider and more effective social networks. This helps them to 
acquire common property resources as their private property. In some cases, the poor 
have no legal titles to their land – only customary use. This is, for instance, true of 
some tribals in India. In a legalistic system, the poor can be dispossessed. 
Consequently, in rural areas, the poor may become relatively less well off and 
struggle to gain subsistence. 
 
There is no doubt that the relative economic dependence of the poor on common 
access resources in developing countries is high, as is pointed out by Dasgupta (1997, 
Pp. 10-11). Apart from the empirical evidence referenced by Dasgupta, Alauddin and 
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Tisdell (1988, pp.118-124) summarise empirical evidence obtained in rural villages in 
West Bengal and Bangladesh which suggests that the poorest members of the villages 
suffer most economic disadvantage as a result of losing access to natural resources as 
economic development occurs. 
 
Migration and the poor 
The deteriorating economic situation of the poor in rural areas may force them to 
consider migrating to urban areas to search for better economic alternatives. However, 
migration is not a costless process and it is not without economic risks for migrants. 
The rural poor are least able to cope with these costs and risks. This is because the 
richer members of the rural community are likely to have some savings to help 
finance the migration of family members, have wider social networks than the poor, 
are better educated and are more aware of urban opportunities. Thus, the rural poor 
seem to be especially disadvantaged in coping with market adjustment if it involves 
new migration patterns.  
 
Lipton (1977) argued that the poor find it more difficult to be geographically mobile 
than those who are better off. One of the reasons for this is the relatively high level of 
transaction costs involved in geographic mobility (Bardhan and Udry, 1999; 
Carrington et al., 1996). Regmi and Tisdell (2003) found evidence to support Lipton’s 
hypothesis. They suggest that the richer members of rural communities were more 
proactive in their decision-making than the poor who may be more reactive, and 
argued that this helps to explain observed rural to urban migration patterns in 
developing countries. This strongly suggests that there is considerable scope for 
applying behavioral economics to the study of the poor (Mullainathan, 2006).  
 
5. Social, Institutional and Behavioral Aspects of Poverty and Economic 
Adjustment. 
Social, institutional and behavioral factors influence the prospects for reducing 
poverty and the dynamics of its reduction. Consider in turn the importance of social 
networks, institutional/cultural lock-in of poor communities and learnt behaviors as 
possible impediments to the reduction of the occurrence of poverty. 
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Social Networks 
In some societies, the poor are excluded or almost excluded from social networks 
which play an important role in providing information about economic opportunities. 
For example, members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in India may have 
more limited networks than Indians not in these groups. Furthermore, their poverty 
often persists because of their social exclusion from occupations that could enhance 
their income prospects (Ramanjaneyulu, in press). In addition, their lack of contact 
with individuals with economic and political influence is likely to mean that they have 
a weak bargaining position in resource-use disputes.  
 
Again the poor generally have a low level of education and this further reduces their 
access to information and their ability to defend their economic position. In some 
cases, social networks provide members of the social network with economic rents. 
Members may be keen to limit the size of network so their rents are not diminished or 
do not disappear. Up to a point, a social network may be akin to a club. The per unit 
benefits to members may be of a reversed-U shaped form as a function of the number 
of members in the network. Furthermore, the network needs to consider the ‘qualities’ 
of potential members in terms of the benefits they may bring to the network before 
including them in the network. When social networks consist mainly of richer 
members of society, they may believe that additions of the poor will diminish the 
quality and value of the network. 
 
Institutional/cultural lock-in 
Some social groups become locked into poverty because of strong cultural bonds and 
social networks within their communities. Their local networks often involve social 
reciprocity and this can be a means of economic insurance (Dasgupta, 1993, pp.208-
212). This seems to be a true of some tribal groups (such as some Australian 
Aborigines) living in remote regions where economic opportunities are few. But this 
phenomenon is not limited to Australia. It applies to many tribal groups or ethnic 
minorities in the Asian-Pacific and in other parts of the world.  
 
The importance of the personalized nature of many transactions in rural communities 
has been emphasized by Dasgupta (1993, p.141). He also points out the significance 
of culture as an influence on behaviors. The horizons of tribal and similar traditional 
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groups and rural communities may be confined largely to their own community. They 
might not, for instance, put a high store on formal education since it leads to little or 
no economic improvement in their situation in their own community, and migration to 
join outside communities may be viewed as a remote possibility. In a way, the 
existing social isolation of such groups furthers their continuing isolation and hampers 
the extension of their social networks. 
 
In addition, if a poverty-ridden social group is easily identifiable, its members may 
face economic discrimination by other communities. Given limited knowledge of the 
economic abilities of individuals from this group, they may be judged by other 
communities in an imperfect world by their imagined average performance or by a 
stereotype. Such discrimination is likely to act as a deterrent to individuals from a 
poverty-stricken group seeking economic opportunities outside of their group. This 
also reduces their returns from acquiring skills which potentially have economic value 
outside the group. Therefore, rationally their incentives for such acquisition of skills 
and education are weakened. 
 
Behavioral path-dependence 
Most communities transmit to their offspring skills and information that are likely to 
assist them in earning their livelihood. This transmission may be supported by 
customs and codes and hierarchies (compare Max Weber as translated by Parsons, 
1947). As a result, a community may become locked into a particular way of life. The 
community may not display any economic development and may experience an 
increase in its relative poverty compared to the wider community. In certain 
circumstances (for example, growing environmental degradation) its living standards 
may fall and absolute poverty may become widespread. 
 
It has been said, for example, that in many cases, the Bedouin have become locked 
into a particular lifestyle involving migration and grazing. Consequently poverty 
amongst the Bedouin has become pronounced. When such groups in Iran have been 
asked to change their utilization of rangelands or their occupations, they are reported 
to rangeland regulators that this is the only way of life they know and that it has been 
handed down by their forefathers (personal communication Kamran Zendhdel, 
February, 2007). They prefer the status quo (the life they know, despite its hardships) 
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and they wish to continue it in deference to their ancestors (an inheritance factor). In 
such circumstances, it is very difficult to implement reforms that may reduce the 
extent of poverty experienced by such groups. See also Tisdell (2003b). 
 
6. Concluding Comments 
More attention needs to be paid to the dynamics of policies intended to alleviate 
poverty and to the trajectories of adjustment processes. This has been illustrated in the 
case of policies designed to reduce the incidence of poverty arising from the over 
exploitation of shared natural resources, by identifying difficulties that can arise for 
the poor when private property regimes are extended and market systems become 
more pervasive. Social, institutional/cultural and behavioral factors have also been 
highlighted that interfere with patterns of economic adjustment and create difficulties 
for poverty alleviation within some social groups. All such impediments to the 
process (dynamics) of poverty alleviation need to be considered. The trajectories of 
economic policies are just as important as their final or equilibrium consequences. In 
fact, they are probably more important. 
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